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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
As provided by statute, the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review this final 
agency action resulting in this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(3)(j). These 
issues were addressed in the trial court and with the Morgan County Board of Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
ISSUE NUMBER 1. : Did the district court err in determining that Utah 
Code Ann. § 17-27a-704 (2005) allowed for the McMillan's appeal of a land use decision 
to the Morgan County Board of Appeals to be filed on the 30 day rather than within ten 
days? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
With regard to Issue Numbers 1, the standard for review is that the appellate court 
should give no deference to the trial court's conclusions of law and reviews those 
conclusions for correctness. See, State v. Tooele County, 44 P. 3d 680 (2002). Likewise, 
a district court's interpretation of a statutory provision is a question of law that the 
appellate court reviews for correctness. See, Bearden v. Croft, 31 P.3d 537 (2001). The 
appellate court gives no deference to the legal conclusions of the trial court on questions 
of law. Id. A matter of statutory construction is a conclusion of law reviewable under a 
correction of error standard. See, Cache County v. Property Tax Division, 922 P.2d 758 
(Utah 1996). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS WHOSE 
INTERPRETATION ARE DETERMINATIVE 
None. 
STATUTE WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE 
Utah Code Ann. §17-27a-704 (2005). 
(l)The county shall enact an ordinance establishing a reasonable time to 
appeal a decision of a land use authority to an appeal authority. 
(2) In the absence of such an ordinance and at a minimum, an adversely 
affected party shall have ten calendar days to appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On May 17, 2005, the Morgan County Council (an elected body) approved a 
subdivision proposed to be constructed in Morgan County by - Rex Wilkinson and 
Coventry Cove (the Appellants). On June 16, 2005, Michael and Ann McMillan filed a 
Notice of Appeal with the Morgan County Board of Appeals (an appointed body) 
challenging the County Council's decision according to statute. In its 2005 session, the 
Utah State Legislature had enacted Utah Code Ann. § 17-27a-704 to be effective May 2, 
2005. 
On June 16, 2005, when the McMillans filed their notice of appeal to the Board of 
Appeals, Morgan County had not enacted by ordinance a specific time period in which 
affected parties had to file a notice of appeal. Appellants argued to the Morgan County 
Board of Appeals and to the Second Judicial District Court that the McMillans' appeal 
was untimely based upon Utah Code Ann. § 17-27a-704 (2005). The Morgan County 
Board of Appeals ruled that Utah Code Ann. § 17-27a-704 (2005) provided a minimum 
and not a maximum of 10 days in which an affected party had to appeal the Morgan 
County Council's land use decision and that the McMillans' appeal was timely. The 
Second District Court also ruled that the McMillans' appeal was timely. Appellants 
believe that both the Morgan County Board of Appeals and the Second District Court are 
in error and that the McMillans' appeal was untimely due to the fact that it was filed on 
the 30th day when the Utah State Legislature had allowed only ten days for any such an 
appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On May 17, 2005, the Morgan County Council approved a subdivision 
proposed to be constructed in the County by Rex Wilkinson and Coventry Cove, 
LLC. R. 388,fl. 
2. On June 16, 2005, Michael and Ann McMillan filed a Notice of Appeal 
with the Morgan County Board of Appeals challenging the County Council's 
decision. R. 388, 1J2. 
3. In its 2005 session, the Utah State Legislature enacted Utah Code Ann. § 
17-27a-704 to be effective May 2, 2005. R. 388, [^3. 
4. On June 16, 2005, when the McMillans filed their notice of appeal of the 
Morgan County Council's land use decision, Morgan County had not enacted by 
ordinance a specific time period in which affected parties had to file a notice of 
appeal. R. 388 [^5, R. 389 f 10. 
5. The Morgan County Board of Appeals heard argument, entered findings 
and ruled, among other things, that the ten day limitation of Utah Code Ann. §17-
27a-704 provided a minimum and not a maximum of 10 days in which an affected 
party had to appeal the Morgan County Council's land use decisions. R. 14 (See 
also R. 7-20.) 
6. The trial court further found that the McMillans' notice of appeal was, as a 
matter of law, timely under Utah Code Ann. § 17-27a-704. R. 387-390. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This appears to be a case of first impression. It is the position of the 
Appellants that the intent of the legislature in enacting the subject statute was to allow 
only ten days to appeal land use decisions unless the County allowed for a longer period 
of time by ordinance. The trial court applied a reasonableness standard instead of 
applying the test of determining the intent of the legislature. Appellants request that the 
Court of Appeals find that the trial court erred in interpreting Utah Code Ann. §17-27a-
704 to allow for the subject appeal to be filed within 30 days. This Court should find that 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-27a-704 only allowed for a ten day period for filing the subject 
appeal and that because it was not filed on or before May 27, 2005, that it was untimely. 
Therefore, this Court should find that the Morgan County Board of Appeals' decision to 
disallow the subdivision must be reversed 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE LANGUAGE OF UTAH CODE §17-27a-704 ALLOWS FOR A TEN DAY 
APPEAL PERIOD IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, NOT A LONGER PERIOD. 
The Morgan County Board of Appeals ignored the law of the state of Utah by 
entertaining the appeal filed by the McMillans. The McMillans' appeal was untimely and 
was not properly perfected. This court should find that the McMillans' appeal was not 
filed in a timely manner. At the time of the Morgan County Council's land use decision 
pertaining to Coventry Cove, LLC, which was May 17, 2005, Utah Code Ann. §17-27a-
704 was in effect. Moreover, Morgan County did not have any ordinance pertaining to 
the time period for appealing a land use decision at that time. 
Based upon the foregoing, the statutory time period in which to appeal the May 
17, 2005, decision of the County Council was ten calendar days therefrom, expiring on 
May 27, 2005. See Utah Code Ann. §17-27a-704. Rather than filing their appeal before 
the deadline, Michael and Ann McMillan, by and through their counsel, sent a letter to 
Morgan County purporting to appeal the May 17, 2005, land use decision, which was 
hand delivered on June 16, 2005, to Morgan County. R. 388, [^5. Therefore, the Morgan 
County Board of Appeals did not have jurisdiction to entertain the appeal because the 
appeal was not timely filed, having been filed approximately twenty days late. 
The Morgan County Board of Appeals derives its jurisdiction to hear cases from 
the Utah statute and from Morgan County ordinance. There was no Utah statute, nor 
Morgan County ordinance giving the Morgan County Board of Appeals the opportunity 
to hear an appeal which was filed late. The Board of Appeals is not vested with any 
authority under Utah law to consider the merits of the McMillans' appeal because of its 
untimely nature, and the McMillan appeal to the Morgan County Board of Appeals 
should have been dismissed accordingly. 
The Morgan County Board of Appeals read the applicable statute to mean "at 
least" instead of "at a minimum." R. 14 at f42. Substituting its own verbiage for the 
verbiage of the Utah legislature provides a different meaning to the statute. The phrase 
"at a minimum" refers to the prior section of the applicable statute, and means that a 
county, if it decides to set forth a time period for hearing appeals of land use decisions, 
must set a period that is no less than ten days. However, in the absence of any ordinance 
setting forth an appeal time, the appeal time is ten days. The Morgan County Board of 
Appeals ignored the above-referenced law and rendered an opinion which was clearly 
result-oriented. R. 7-20. Moreover, the Second District Court wrongly upheld the 
decision of the Board of Appeals. 
Rex Wilkinson and Coventry Cove, LLC respectfully request that this court apply 
Utah Code Ann. §17-27a-704, according to the plain language of the statute and not 
substitute its own wording for the language "at a minimum" like the Morgan County 
Board of Appeals did and which the Second District Court followed. Based on such, Rex 
Wilkinson and Coventry Cove, LLC respectfully request that this Court reverse the ruling 
below and require the Board of Appeals to vacate its decision because it was based upon 
an untimely appeal. 
II. THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT APPLIED THE WRONG 
STANDARD TO ITS STATUTORY INTERPRETATION. 
The Second District Court applied a "reasonable man" standard to its interpretation of 
the contested statutory language. See Record at 451. This is not the appropriate 
standard. The standard which the Utah Supreme Court has articulated in interpreting and 
constructing statutes is to give effect to the legislature's intent. "This court's primary 
objective in construing enactments is to give effect to the legislature's intent." See, 
Gohler v. Wood, 919P.2d 561,562 (Utahl996); Lyon v. Burton. 5 P.3d 616, (Utah 2000). 
The plain language of a statute is generally the best indication of that intent. See, Perrine 
v. Kennecott Mining Corp, 911 P.2d 1290,1292 (Utah 1996). 
The reasoning of the trial court is found in the transcript of the February 10, 2006 
hearing: 
[A]s I just try to read [the statute] as an ordinary person would, not necessarily 
trying to parse words and commas and ands, and I know that those, the word 
"and", Mr. Lee, must by statutory construction be given its normal meaning and 
that I have to intend that the legislature intended that to be used advisably. But at 
the end of the day (inaudible), what does that mean? What would an ordinary 
person interpret that to mean? Not somebody that has a degree in English. But 
just what does it mean? And I interpret it today to mean that a person filing an 
appeal has a minimum often days and then a reasonable period of time as may be 
set by the governing body, and in this instance, the County has spoken, it's 30 
days. And I find in this case that the McMillans filed their appeal within 30 days." 
See Record 451 (at transcript of February 10, 2005 ruling, page 38). 
Thus, it is clear from reviewing the trial court's oral ruling at the hearing that it was not 
attempting to give effect to the legislature's intent. Rather the trial court was trying to 
determine what an ordinary person would understand from the statute. This means that 
the trial court applied a reasonable man standard where it should have given effect to the 
legislature's intent. This is a significant distinction and led to an inaccurate ruling from 
the trial court. Had the trial court given any effect to the legislature's intent, the court 
would have concluded that the legislature intended to establish that the time period for 
appealing any county land use decision was to be ten days in the absence of any other 
time period established by the county. The plain language of the statute is that: "In the 
absence of such an ordinance and at a minimum, an adversely affected party shall have 
ten calendar days to appeal." It is undisputed that the County did not at the time have an 
ordinance setting forth any time period for appealing land use decisions. R. at 388, at 
para 5, R 389 at para 10. All references to an ordinance establishing a thirty day appeal 
period are to an ordinance that was enacted after the McMillan appeal had been filed on 
June 16, 2005. R. 388 at para 5. 
A significant problem with the Court's interpretation of the statute is that, under 
the trial court's ruling, an appeal period should be at least 10 days basically rendering the 
deadline for filing an appeal to be indeterminate. Surely the legislature did not intend for 
appeals of land use decisions to be without deadlines! The only interpretation of the 
language at issue which truly gives any meaning to the legislative intent is to conclude 
that the legislature intended for ten days to be the appeal deadline when no other deadline 
was established by county ordinance. The interpretation espoused by Appellees does not 
make any sense and requires additional wording to be inserted or additional assumptions 
made not expressly set forth by the legislature. Thus, the Court should have interpreted 
the statute to preclude the McMillan's appeal to the Morgan County Board of Appeals as 
untimely. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, Appellants request that the Court of Appeals find 
that the trial court erred in interpreting Utah Code Ann. §17-27a-704 to allow for the 
subject appeal to be filed within 30 days. This Court should find that Utah Code Ann. 
§17-27a-704 only allowed for a ten day period for filing the subject appeal and that 
because it was not filed prior to May 27, 2005, that it was untimely. Therefore, this 
Court should require that the Board of Appeals5 decision to disallow the subdivision must 
be reversed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED thisn / day of February, 2007. 
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1 question of whether or not the 30-day period was reasonable. 
2 It concluded that it was. Because again, we read the first 
3 section of the provision, "The county shall enact an ordinance 
4 establishing a reasonable time to appeal a decision." The 
5 county could decide. Morgan County may well have decided that 
6 60 days was a reasonable time and that would be fine. And they 
7 may have determined 90 days. It's up to the county to make 
8 that determination. Well, they just hadn't done it in this 
9 case until they were faced with it in the course of this 
10 proceeding and it was - and then it was 30 days. 
11 I'm not suggesting that a reasonable interpretation 
12 of this language is anything other than what it says and that 
13 is this is an open-end, it's carte blanc as long as it's less -
14 or more than 10 days. That's not the position that the 
15 McMillans have taken in this case. They're saying that the 
16 county's charged to do it, Morgan County sat back for several 
17 months and didn't. First of all, they shouldn't benefit by 
18 virtue of the fact that they didn't do what they were charged 
19 by statute to do. But second, when ultimately faced with the 
20 issue of this case, the 30 days, they believed it was a 
21 I reasonable period of time. 
22 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Let me indicate that 
23 first of all that I appreciate the briefing on the issues, and 
24 I thought that the arguments presented on both sides of this 
25 issue were persuasive. It's a difficult issue. It just flat 
36 
1 out is. And because the, as we've all observed, the 
2 grammatical structure of subpart 2 of section 704, is just kind 
3 of awkward, and I think that the statute could have been very 
4 clear by putting "at a minimum" preceding the 10 days. 
5 But the flip side of that is, if they intended a 
6 categorical 10 days, they could have simply said, "in the 
7 absence of such an ordinance, an adversely affected party shall 
8 have 10 days to appeal." Crystal clear. But it chose not to 
9 do that. And 1 have given this a lot of thought and I have, 
10 frankly, as I read the briefs, said, "Yeah, that's right." And 
11 then I go back and read the other ones, "Yeah, that's right." 
12 And so the arguments that can be made are good. But at the end 
13 of the day, I step back and say, "Okay, the buck stops here," 
14 and I just do the best that I can with the analysis of looking 
15 at what I think would be just the ordinary meaning of subpart 
16 2. And it seems to me that the ordinary meaning of that is 
17 that they have a minimum of 10 days. 
18 And then I try - as I try to harmonize Paragraph 1 
19 with the subpart 2, it basically, the whole intent, as I read 
20 this, is that the legislature gave to the county the authority 
21 to set a review of the legislative decisions of the county to a 
22 quasi-judicial body known as the Board of Appeals. And it, the 
23 direction as I read the statute is that you will - speaking to 
24 the county, you will establish a reasonable time period for 
25 these appeals. And in the absence of just very clearly saying, 
37 
1 you have 10 days, in the absence of an ordinance, "an adversely 
2 affected party will have 10 days", it didn't do that. It says, 
3 "at a minimum." 
4 And as I just try to read that as an ordinary person 
5 would, not necessarily trying to parse words and commas and 
6 ands, and I know that those, the word 'and', Mr. Lee, must by 
7 statutory construction be given its normal meaning and that I 
8 have to intend that the legislature intended that to be used 
9 advisedly. But at the end of the day (inaudible), what does 
10 that mean? What would an ordinary person interpret that to 
11 mean? Not somebody that has a degree in English. But just 
12 what does it mean? And I interpret it today to mean that a 
13 person filing an appeal has a minimum of 10 days and then a 
14 reasonable period of time as may be set by the governing body, 
15 and in this instance, the county has spoken, it's 30 days. And 
16 I find in this case that the McMillans filed their appeal 
17 within 30 days. 
18 I appreciate Senator Bell, whom I know personally and 
19 have affection for him as a friend, but right now, this isn't 
20 the law, it just isn't the law. What's the law is what it is 
21 today, as was embodied in Senate Bill 60 and passed on May 2nd 
22 of 2005. And I'm trying to render all parts of this bill 
23 meaningful, and as I do that, I'm just persuaded that they have 
24 at least 10 days and a reasonable period of time thereafter, 
25 I and I think that the county spoke when it accepted their 
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1 appeal. 
2 There's been an issue made that they didn't pay their 
3 filing fee. Well, I don't think that is jurisdictional. And I 
4 think that the county agreed to accept it, their filing fee 
5 later and I think whatever imperfection there may have been in 
6 that process it was cured by the acceptance of the filing fee. 
7 And the parties, thereafter, in reliance of the procedure 
8 implicit in the County's actions, went ahead and prepared this 
9 case and it was argued and heard. And I won't go behind the 
10 merits of whether the Appellate Board was correct, that's not 
11 before the Court today. 
12 But I am ruling today the matter of law that the 
13 appeal filed by the McMillans was timely. And just in 
14 observation, I understand that that creates some problems and 
15 some expectations by people who rely, but if what Mr. Hathaway 
16 has observed, they went off and bought those pieces, those 
17 parcels out of that subdivision after they had notice of an 
18 appeal and I think that by evidence today of the arguments, 
19 there is no common understanding of what that means, and I 
20 think the fact that Senator Bell has introduced a bill to 
21 correct the language in a way that I thought made it very -
22 makes it crystal clear now, is recognition that the legislature 
23 also recognized the, that this language was in-artful. 
24 And I don't feel its appropriate today given that, to 
25 take away an appeal that appears to be reasonable in 30 days. 
39 
1 Just in passing, I'll observe that there is so much 
2 that goes on in our society that's governed by procedure, where 
3 30 days is the recognized appeal period, and so I think that 
4 the Appeals Board acted appropriately in construing the 
5 statute. I don't think they abused their discretion in fixing 
6 a 30-day period, and so for those reasons, I'm denying the 
7 motion to dismiss. 
8 And Mr. Hathaway, I'll ask that you prepare a ruling 
9 today for the Court. 
10 MR. HATHAWAY: I will, Your Honor. 
11 THE COURT: Again, don't know that I'm right, I don't. 
12 It may be that three wiser people or five wiser people may see 
13 it differently than I do, and I respect that. I've just done 
14 the best I can today. Thank you. 
15 (Court is in recess) 
16 ***This is tape 06-08*** 
17 MR. LEE: The Court needs to decide the motion to 
18 consolidate and once, assuming you consolidate the actions, 
19 this (inaudible) indicates my motion should be denied. 
20 THE COURT: Okay. 
21 MR. LEE: And I'd stipulate to that. 
22 THE COURT: Okay. That's helpful. Thank you very 
23 much. 
24 MR. LEE: Sure. 
25 THE COURT: So, we need to just address the motion to 
40 
consolidate? 
MR. 
(inaudible). 
THE 
THE 
MR. 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
LEE: That's my view and at that point I'll submit 
COURT: It's been taken under advisement. 
COURT: Well, let me sort this out. 
LEE: Well, I'll address it with Mr. Hathaway. 
HATHAWAY: I have no problems if it's addressed. 
COURT: Let me just look at that issue. 
LEE: Okay. And, again, assuming the Court 
grant's that motion, what I will do is submit an order denying 
summary judgment motion based on the ruling on the motion to 
dismiss. 
THE 
MR. 
COURT: All right. Thank you. 
LEE: Thank you, Your Honor. 
(Court is in recess) 
-c-
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Petitioners' Motion to Dismiss came before the Court for hearing at 3:00 p.m. on Friday, 
February 10, 2006. Petitioners Morgan County and the Morgan County Council were 
represented by counsel Kelly W. Wright, Petitioner Coventry Cove, LLC tlirough Rex Wilkinson 
was represented by counsel M. Darin Hammond, joining party Parkview Properties, LC, et al. 
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were represented by counsel Eric P. Lee, and Respondents were present and represented by 
counsel Benson L. Hathaway, Jr. The Court, having reviewed the pleadings and papers on file, 
having heard the arguments of counsel, being fully apprised in the premises and for good cause 
appearing, and based on the undisputed facts of records, enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLFSrONS OF L4W 
1. On May 17, 2005, the Morgan County Council approved a subdivision proposed 
to be constructed in the County by Rex Wilkinson and Coventry Cove 
2. On June 16, 2005, Respondents filed a Notice of Appeal with the Morgan Count} 
Board of Appeals challenging the County Council's decision. 
3. In its 2005 session, the Utah State Legislature enacted Utah Code Ann. § 17-27a-
704 to be effective May 2, 2005. 
4. Lltah Code Ann. § 17-27a-704 directs that a county "shall enact an ordinance 
establishing a reasonable time" in which an affected landowner has "to appeal a decision of a 
land use authority," provided such period of time maj not be less than ten (10) days. 
5. On June 16, 2005. "'hen the McMillans filed their notice of appeal of the Morgan 
County Council's land use decision, Morgan County had not enacted by ordinance a specific 
time period in which affected parties had to file a notice of appeal. 
6. Morgan County accepted the McMillans' appeal upon receipt. 
7. By letter dated July 11, 2005. Morgan County informed the McMillans of the 
requirement of payment of a $250 fee for their appeal to the Morgan County Board of Appeals. 
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8. In response to the County's notice, the McMillans immediately paid a $250 fee 
which the County accepted and deposited into its accounts. 
9. The $250 filing fee is not a jurisdictional prerequisite or a condition precedent to 
filing an appeal. 
10. Sometime after the notice of appeal was filed and the fee paid and before the 
hearing held on November 10, 2005, Morgan County enacted an ordinance providing that the 
parties affected by a county land use decisions have 30 days from the date of the County 
Council's decision in which to file an appeal to the Morgan County Board of Appeals. 
11. Morgan County raised the issue of the timeliness of the McMillans^ appeal for the 
first time in its hearing briefs, filed approximately 10 days before the Morgan County Board of 
Appeals hearing. 
12. The Morgan County Board of Appeals heard argument, entered findings and 
ruled, among other things, that the ten day limitation of Utah Code Ann. § 17-27a-704 provided 
a minimum and not a maximum of 10 days in which an affected party had to appeal the Morgan 
Count) CuunciKs land use decisions. 
On the bases of these undisputed facts, from the record and arguments of counsel, the 
Court enters the following: 
ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
17617/0004/878629/01 1 t^3Sd 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 17-27a-704 provides for a minimum time in which an affected 
party has to file an appeal, the maximum amount of time to appeal being statutorily limited to a 
"reasonable time." 
2. The Morgan County Board of Appeals concluded that 30 days is a reasonable 
period of lime to file an appeal when it considered and ruled on the specific facts related to the 
McMillans' notice of appeal filed 30 days after the Morgan County Council's decision. 
3. The McMillans' notice of appeal was, as a matter of law, timely under Utah Code 
Ann. § 17-27a-704. 
4. Payment of the filing fee of $250 is not a condition precedent to the perfecting of 
an appeal under Morgan County ordinance or State law. 
5. Petitioners' Motion to Dismiss is denied. 
DATED this ^ / / day of March, 2006. 
BY THE COURT 
BY: k \ 
The Honorable Michael Ix Lyon 
Second District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
SMITH KNOWLES, P.C. 
)ann Hammond 
Counsel for Petitioners Coventry Cove, LLC 
and Rex Wilkinson 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this JJi day of March, 2006, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing FINDINGS AND ORDER ON PETITIONERS' MOTION TO DISMISS was 
served on the following by the method indicated below: 
Kelly Wright 
Morgan County Attorney 
Morgan County Offices 
48 Young Street 
P.O. Box 886 
Morgan, UT 84050 
('•¥&&. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
() Hand Delivered 
() Overnight Mail 
() Facsimile 
Attorneys for Petitioner Morgan County 
M. Darin Hammond 
SMITH KNOWLHS 
4723 Harrison Boulevard, Suite 200 
Ogdem UT 84403 
Attorneys for Petitioner Coventry Cove, LLC 
Eric P. Lee 
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
370 East South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorneys for Joining Parties Parkview Petitioners 
0-KJ.S, Mail, Postage Prepaid 
() Hand Delivered 
() Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
(i^CLS. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
() Hand Delivered 
() Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
IL^I*-^^ c^^^j. 
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